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Preliminaries
The question from which I begin is: Is there anything characteristic, perhaps
even unique, to be learned from works of fiction? Notthatgaining knowledge
is the be-all and end-all. One can read for many reac;ons, even many reasons
at once, of course - for the plot, or because one takes an interest in the fate of
the heroine, or to savour the language, or for a bet, or to lay to rest one's sense .
of inferiority at being unfamiliar with a cultural icon.
Not all encounters with fiction involve reading. Yet for all their differ-
ences, fictions on the page, on the stage, on radio, on film or on CD-ROM, can
be considered together when it comes to the question of the kind of knowledge
they can furnish. In this context, what holds for reading holds for listening and
watching. My use of literary examples is a maller of convenience.
Although it is just one possible approach to Lake, for someone like myself
whose reading is largely in works that one atlcast hopes are not fictional, it
comes naturally to proceed with an eye to what knowledge can be gained. This
is not always appropriate - looking for lessons in nonsense verse is unlikely to
be rewarding - but it often is, even with fictions. I say 'even' to despatch those
philistine and puritanical philosophers, generally of a positivist bent, who are
tempted to dismiss everything fictive as a pack of lies.
My topic is fiction rather than literature as a whole. If one takes the whole
sweep of literature, embracing the essay, history and even well-wriuen
philosophy, the answer to the question of what could be learned from it would
be easy and unhelpful: anything and everything that can be put into words.
Just what fictions are, and how they work, are deep and difficult issues. I
propose to pass them by. For present purposes, all we need is a working sense
of what to count as fictional. Most novels, most of the drama, and a good deal
of poetry is included. There are borderline cases - autobiographical lyrics, for
example, and cases which depend on one's philosophical views, such as
Paradise Lost, and De Rerum Natura. And there are mixed cases; historical
novels, and The Iliad. That docsn 't maUer. Bertrand Russell once claimed
that Piccadilly is a fiction, but that docsn't count; he meant it is a logical
construction. Russell could tellthediffcrence between London and Casterbridge
as well as the rest of us. Fictional fiction is our concern, and there arc abundant
7
The Sydney Society ofLiterature and Aesthetics
unproblematic cases to consider.
A great deal of fiction has a narrative form and hence a plot, but that is not
essential here either. The plot-free imaginative short piece, such as Borges on
the fabulous library, and the visionary lyric, such as Edgar Allan Poe's City in
the Sea, are fictions. The reason that narrative is notessential is that the details
ofaplot are among the things one most emphatically does not learn, in the sense
I intend. There being no Mr Pickwick who skates and is sued for breach of
promise, we cannotlcarn these things about him.
Incidental Information
Once the body of work which is to count as fiction has becn sufficiently
indicated, it becomes at once apparent that agreat deal of information, of many
different kinds, is to be gleaned from it.
The Pickwick Papers could well inform us that in the 1830's the Rochester
coach departed on the hour from outside the Swan in Southwark. That is a
fairly specific matter, but general knowledge can be imparted just as readily.
Growing up in urban New Zealand after the disappearance of horses from the
streets, I got my principal information on the vocabulary and techniques of
.<;addlery and bridling for many years from 'How They Brought the Good News
from Ghent to Aix'.
By reading KeaL<; you can learn that sedge is an annual of the wetlands.
Lewis Carroll can teach you what 'chortle' means. If you rcad the Waverley
novels you will discover what English-speaking middlebrows have, this past
century and a half, regarded as rattling good yams. George Eliot can instruct
you concerning what was on middle c1a<;s people's minds in the 1870's, and
Arnold Bennell on the furnishing of interiors in Staffordshire a hundred years
ago. Ring Lardner rightly claimed that one of his short stories was an example
of what can be done with a stub pencil.
Most authors reveal a fair amount about their own character and opinions.
We note all these ways of becoming beller informed, only to set them aside.
They are beside our point. Such information is incidental, having no essential
connection with the fictionalily of the works. Our question is: what can be
lcarned from thefictional aspect of the making of fictions? More specifically,
can anything characteristic be learned in this way, anything not accessible by
other means, for example, through the sciences?
Some Alleged Differences Between Scientific, Factual, and Other Knowledge
The contrast between fiction and olher modes is nOlthat between Particular
ane/General: or between Quality and Quanrity, since both science and fiction
cross those divides. Nor is it a queslion of Non-liteml and Literal Truth, since
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factual discourse can be metaphorical, analogical, hypcrbolical, and ironic.
Nor is the difference a matter of Subject Maller. Although there may be a
tendency for literature, and especially fiction, to dwell on human themes, any
contrast between literary and scientific knowledge in terms of a division of
subject matter is going to fail. There are human sciences. even sciences of the
human psyche. And there are fictions with non-human themes. I don't know
if The Lord of the Rings will count here, but Blake on tigers, Lawrence on
snakes, and Kipling, via M' Andrew, on steam propulsion, should.
It is not quite correct to make the distinction rest on the contrast between
The Possible and the Actual, nor does it lie in the presence or absence of A
Moral Dimension. There are factual and fictive works in all of these camps.
Discovery or Creation? There does seem to be something right in the notion
that while the scientist's role is one of discovery, that of the author of fiction
is to create. The scientist is subject to the discipline ofliteral and mundane fact,
while the author is liberated from any such responsibility. But the distinction
must be handled with care. In the first place, fiction is open to criticism on
the grounds that it fails to be faithful to significant matters of truth and reality.
One can fault Dostoevsky, for example, for purveying the furphy that without
Divine sanction morality disintegrates. And criticize Dylan Thomas for
patronizing the illusion that sin is innocent.
In the second place, it is this very conLrast, between creation and discovery,
that Neh;on Goodman challenges.! It is to his critique that I now tum.
Goodman's Metaphysical Pluralism
Goodman's philosophy is a modem-day, pluralist, descendent of Kant's
Lranscendental idealism. Its central thesis is the repudiation of the idea of a
ready-made world 'out there'. According to Goodman, it is a grievous error
to suppose that there is, in actual Rcality, a single, unitary, consistent and
coherent World, with a nature and structure of its own, waiting for humans to
explore (and to be defeated in exploring). That supposilion is the Realist
illusion.
Although he doesn't put it in so many words, we might put his rejection of
the basic Realist stance in this way: In the beginning, the world was without
form and void. According to Genesis, God then gave it a sufficient structure
and nature that it could be looked upon and seen to be good. According to Kant,
there isjusta formless noumenal world, an undifferentiated blancmange, until,
under the inevitable workings of our minds, humans project their classifying
and ordering intuitions and categories onto that world. The result is the
phenomenal world of Appearance. According to later thinkers, such as
Thomas Kuhn, there may be more than one way to project and impose
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categorizations, and so more than one Apparent, phenomenal world. Accord-
ing to Goodman, we should take one further step, and repudiate the original
noumenal world. There is no underlying formless Real. There is no point in
aspiring to uncover the true nature of What Is. There are instead many equally
valid Reals, the products of the creative organizing power of the human
intellect
It is our intellectual work, devising and imposing organizational catego-
ries, which gives form. Wedothisbydividing the world into kinds and classes,
according to the similarities and differences we find among its deni7..cns.
These likenesses and differences are not objective features of What Is. They
are functions of human interests, and capacities, and habits. There are no
properties of things "out there". It is up to us to marshal a realm according to
its items by descriptions which seem appropriate to us. The world of living
things, for example, has mammals in it if but only if it strikes us that there are
interesting and sign ificant resem blances between whales and raccoons. If size
and shape and habitat are all that maller, the world's biology has terrestrials,
and aquatic and avian creatures. Where there is no terminology for vertebrate
and invertebmte, or wann and cold blooded, or herbivore and carnivore, there
is no sense in questions about a real ba<;is for taxonomy. Nothing in Nature
forces the issue of what c1a<;sifications are legitimate.
We cannot assess a description of the world by comparing it to actuality.
We have no access to actual ity except through one oranotherconceptualization
of it. We assess one description by comparing it with another. This
claustrophobic imprisonment, with no escape past words to the Real, is not
confined to Goodman. It is present in much recent Continental philosophy.
According to Goodman, even the question of what things are there to be
classified is a function of human organizing activity. Are there such things
as sunset<;? That depends on how we count If what is happening tonight is a
repeat oflast night, our world includes an enduring, substantial sun, and the sun
rises and sets repeatedly. If tonight's display isjudged to be wholly other than
what happened last night, we have sunsets in our world, but in place of a
substantial sun, a sequence of sunrisings, shinings and settings.
A central thesis in Goodman's philosophy is: Nothing significant about the
world is given. There is one way of taking the world according to which the
Earth is still. There is another, according to which it follows an elliptical path
about the Sun. On yet a third, with a non-standard reference frame, the Earth
dances the role of Petrushka. Goodman claims that all three are equally
legitimate. What makes him such a radical are his further claims that these
ways of taking things are incompatible, and so not all true in the same world.
This is not a case of the glass being half full or half empty. It is not even
a case of the train receding from the station and the station receding from the
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train. It is not a caseofa bright speck bei ng a black horse. These can be treated
as describing the same situation from different points of view. According to
Goodman, there is nooverarching point of view from which different reference
frames can be combined to yield one consistent truth.
So that, in Goodman's philosophy, since several clashing claims are all
equally true, they must be true in different worlds. There are as many different
worlds as there are coherent and systematic, yet irreconcilable, ways of
categorizing, organizing, and hence construing or interpreting, What Is.
Goodman goes so far as to claim that there are many different Earths, all
equally actual and real, in the different worlds we have made. Hence my
labdling of the position as metaphysical pluralism.
A Goodman world is often called a version, to underline its irreducibly
creative human component. But the sting is still there - these are not all just
versions, some beuer, some worse, some valueless, of the one given World.
And truth is nm determined or estimated by how well a version corresponds
with absolute facts concerning the Real World. We could never determine any
such correspondence, and anyway the absolute facts do not exist.
What this implies is that all human cognitive endeavour, in science or
history, in fiction, painting, or music, shares a common character. All these
endeavours impose order, and in imposing order they fix an ontology and settle
the nature of their world. For example, by settling on a colour vocabulary, we
determine which are the right colour terms to apply to any visible objcct. We
could usea colour vocabulary where blue includes indigo,orone in which blue
and indigo count as different colours. Our choice will fix whether a bird is
to be described as blue, or as indigo, or as both. When that is settled, there is
no further issue as to whether the bird is really blue, or really indigo, or both.
Different versions of our world, resting on different categorizations, arise
in the pursuit ofdifferent purposes. The natural historian develops a taxonomy
according to one set of desiderata. A hunter - gatherer may well classify
differently, on edibility criteria rather than likeness of form, establishing a
different taxonomy. Each of them can be seen to be saying: Look at the realm
of animals this way. The ways may not be reconcilable. They are both valid.
Artists do the same. They create works which we should approach as
presentations inviting us to sec their realm this way. The distinction between
scientific discovery and artistic creation evaporates. The scientific work will
endure so long as it provides an insightful ordering of its rcalm. The artistic
work will be valued so long as it provides an insightful ordering of its realm.
There are no mind-independent facts, no ready-made world, to which science,
or history, or fiction, need be faithful. What is required is fidelity to the world,
or version, which the categorizing and describing activity ha<; itselfcontributed
to create.
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We are used to the idea - metaphorical though it be -that Trollope and Jane
Austen and Van Gogh and Rembrandt crealC worlds for us. We should get
used to the idea - not metaphorical but as literal as anything in Goodman -that
Darwin and Feynman and Gibbon and even David Attenborough do the same.
All relativisms arc gospels of relaxation. This one is no exception. It
counsels against striving to sift and sort,to judge and reconcile these various
and somewhat incompatible accounL<; of reality. Lie back and enjoy not just
the world's rich variety, but the rich variety of worlds.
In Goodman's philosophy, a distinction does remain between factual and
fictive discourse. The distinction resides in whether the names used arc
presented as denoting items in the realm to which the discourse as a whole is
taken to apply. There is something right here. In most fiction, it is the
particulars, the people, places, and situations, for which an invented vocabu-
lary is needed. Think of Barsetshire. Terms for the protagonists, or for the
hospital and the newspaper, will need to be new-minted. But the generallCrms
- for dean and archdeacon, hope, envy and loyalty, horse and carriage, rain and
shine - the organizing categories of the novelist's world, carry straight across
from history and biography.
Fantasy, myth, and science fiction differ somewhat in this regard. There,
we do need new general terms, for orcs, or gorgons, or daleks. So perhaps for
Goodman there is more difference between fantasy and myth,on the one hand,
and realistic fiction, together with biography and history, on the other, than
there is between fiction and history or biography.
From his perspective human thought and knowledge rest on the creative
use of sets of categories. PredicalCs, general terms, are used in descriptions
to make, mark, and emphasize similarities and di fferences among the constitu-
ents of the realm to which they are applied. Whether the use of singular lCrms
is denotational or nOl matters little. It follows that in principle, there is no
distinction between what we can learn from fiction, and what from other
experiments in world-building. Here is Goodman'sassimilation of literary and
scientific knowledge.
The Portrai t Metaphor
We can understand Goodman as offering us a Portrait metaphor for knowledge
of all kinds. We are familiar with the idea that there can be more than one
portrait of the same subject. Two portraits can differ markedly, yet both be
good portraits. Indeed, they can not only differ, but present incompatible
characterizations, and both be good. More yet, they can both be equally good.
We feel no need, and indeed want to resist, any tidy-minded attempt to insist
we choose between them, and deny validity in one case, or the other, or both.
How can this be? Ironically, the answer tells against Goodman's meta-
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physics. Notice that the more interesting the siner, the wider the range ofgood
portrayals that is open. People can have a rich, multifaceted, often conflicted
and paradoxical, nature. It is the very plurality of inner traits, from which we
can selcct, that makes the diversity of portraits possible. It is not that the inner
self is nothing in itself but a bare canva<;, on which we ean projcct a version.
It is inner wealth, not inner impoverishment, that explains the many portraits.
Inner complexity means we cannot tell the whole truth. That leaves room for
different, yet equally faithful, renderings, each of which tells some pan of the
truth.
This provides a model for the differing, apparently conflicting, portrayals
of our World. Different portraits, at odds with each other, do not imply two
siners, one in each painter's own world. Different portrayals of the World
rest on the same phenomenon, an underlying Nature too rich, not loa poor, to
dictate a single 'taking'.
When we sit down to assess just how much incompatible material we find
ourselves equally drawn to affirm, the portrait metaphor is rather sustained
than undermined. Work in the sciences yields several different accounts of
how things are. But mere difference docs not signal any conflict. Marine
biology is not at odds with particle physics, or palaeontology, or linguistics, to
any significant extent.
There are indefinitely many different ways to approach comprehending the
world. All these ways highlight one set of likenesses above others. Goodman
is right to point to the range of choices we have in developing taxonomies, and
the leeway we have in setting the boundaries of our categories. But this docs
not imply that classifications are imposed, rather than discovered. All the
likenesses and differences we deal in are there to be found in the World. None
depend on an organizing human intelligence. A plenitude of real distinctions,
and real likenesses, underlies our limited human plurality of versions.
Goodman is also right to point out that there is not only a plurality of
versions, but indeed unresolved conflict between rival accounts, even in the
sciences. One thinks of the contrast between particle theory and quantum
fields. It is only the gospel of relaxation, however, that would lead us to
conclude that there is no fact of the maller as to which is more nearly correct.
It is in the human world that apparent conflict among portraits emerges
most commonly. Such a complex and conflicted world, which so alters in
appearance according to the point of view of the beholder, is just the sort of
world we would expect to yield equally attractive opposing depictions.
Fact, Fiction and Explanation
Difference and conflict among world versions docs not refute Realism about
the world's complex Nature, and so docs not support Goodman's metaphysical
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pluralism. The megalomania implicit in claims that Nature has no nature
unless humans impart it will I trust have struck you forcibly enough. The
anthropocentrism involved isequally striking. It leaves humanity, at the centre
of the cosmic drama, as a totally unintelligible given. There arc no resources
in any variant of transcendental idealism to account for the existence of the
human race. For the very categories ofcause and effect which are required for
that account are supposed to be of our own creation.
This is a spectacular instance of a more general problem. By imposing
organization we can, as Goodman so often insists, provide intelligibility, or
insight, or a fresh view of things. But this cannot provide any explanation of
how things come to be the way they are. Explanation goes beyond categorizing
to the forces at work in shaping the categories. The entire dimension of
explanation is missing from Goodman's work.
Explanation also provides, in my opinion, our key to the essential differ-
ence betwccn the fictional and the factual. It is a maller ofaim. In the sciences
thcre is a natural history phase which sets forth a realm displaying at least some
rudiments oforder. That is How Things Are. Then there is a theoretical phase
whose aim is to identify the forces at work which explain the transfonnations
through which that realm passes, including the transfonnations which account
for How Things Come to Be as They Arc.
In identifying the forces at work in a given realm, which is at the heart of
the explanatory enterprise, the notion of equally good, competing accounts is
at its most inappropriate. Either the proposed forces are at work or they are
not; this is a factofthe maller which docs not depend on how our interests lead
us to describe the situation.
In works of fiction, by contrast, this explanatory design is absent. That is
inevitable, since we are not presented with a world where explorations can be
made into the underlying forces at work. What is presented is not open to
experimental investigation. The author ofa fiction presents a world to contem-
plate rather than one to explore.
It might be thought that marking the distinction betwccn fact and fiction by
way of explanation provides no proper home for history and biography, since
they furnish no natural history to be explained. But history and biography
share with the natural and social sciences both the discipline of using only
categories which are continually validated in exploration, and a concern with
providing an explanation of their perceived facts. Although these explanations
do not present deductions from quantitative genemllaws, they are explanations
nevertheless. A successful piece of biographical or historical writing will
make plain to the reader how it is, given what we know of the general
tendencies of human nature and behaviour, that matters fell out as they did.
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Fiction's Distinctive Contribution
With fiction and fact now distinguished, what can fiction contribute? Al-
though I do not claim that this is all that fiction can teach, it nevertheless seems
clear to me that one traditional doctrine is correct: from fiction we can gather
a sense of human possibilities. Fictions present ways of feeling, ofacting, and
of living, ranging beyond most people's experience of actual life. Fictions
enlarge the range of ways in which we can set ourselves to act and react, and
a typical novel or film will present not just one, but a contrasting group ofsuch
alternatives. From exposure to such works we can learn to feel, to judge, and
to live. Fictions arc variant portraits of the forms human sensibility can take.
Memorable works present original alternatives, or present them with
peculiar vivacity and force. Formula novels and soaps have their charms, but
as they arc not presenting anything new in alternative ways of being, they are
not instructive, except in the incidental way in which Dick Francis, for
example, teaches us about the racing game.
Encouraging the contemplation of alternatives to one's present way of
feeling and of life is characteristic, but it is not a monopoly of fiction.
Philosophy,especially moral and social philosophizing, anthropology, and the
history ofexotic times and places can all provide it. Fiction isdifferent in how
itgocs about the business. The difference is that between showing and telling.
The distinguishing mark of the fictive mode of presentation is that it docs not
consist in a series of statements as to how life can be led. It consists in
presenting, in a manner which captures the imagination, specific alternatives,
given with enough detail for us to enter into them and get something of a feel
for how it would be to live with such a sensibility and approach. In the best
fiction alternatives are made to seem much more genuinely live possibilities
than with the same alternatives set forth discursively. They reach into the
emotional tone of a stance toward life. They can be sufficiently vivid to be
literally seductive, which is why censorship is an important issue for fiction,
but not for philosophy. Fictions can be effective in moral education where
sheerly conceptual thought yields no more than abstrdct assent, so they can
give us actually useable insight into the human condition. Thus philosophers
are bound to be fiction' s friends.
Note
N. Goodman. Ways oJ Worldf7UJking. Indianapolis. 1978. Goodman and C. Z.
Elgin. ReconceplioflS in Philosophy and Olher Arls and Sciences, London. 1988.
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Robyn Williams, distinguished scientific writer and broadcaster,
addressed the Society on 'Docs the Scientist need the Arts' on 16
March 1994. Sketched by Ulf Kaiser.
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